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Abstract:
1
 Since the 1990s scholars of party politics have written of the increasing 
regionalization of Canadian party politics, going as far as to label the current system 
“balkanized”. Using three widely established measures of party nationalization (party coverage, 
uniformity of support, and patterns of electoral competition), and one new measure (analysis of 
party advertisements), this paper explores the regionalization thesis in the post 1990s political 
landscape. While there is widespread consensus in the literature that the Canadian party system 
is highly regionalized, this paper provides evidence to the contrary. Rather than a balkanization 
of Canadian electoral and party politics we are witnessing a re-nationalization of Canadian party 
politics. This is especially true for those parties that compete in English Canada. Where 
regionalization, remains, however, is in the province of Quebec. Not only does the Bloc 
Quebecois represent a regionalizing force in itself, but the party's very presence alters the 
strategies of the other parties that compete in Quebec. As a result of the different dynamics of 
party competition in Quebec, we are left with two distinct party systems: a regional party system 
in Quebec and a national party system in the rest of Canada.  
Keywords: political parties; party nationalization; regionalization; party system 
Résumé: Depuis les années 1990, les analystes de la politique des partis ont discuté la 
régionalisation croissante des partis canadiens, allant jusqu'à qualifier le présent système de 
"balkanisé". Utilisant trois mesures connues de la nationalisation des partis (la couverture média, 
l'uniformité de l'appui, les formes de compétition électorale) et une nouvelle mesure (l'analyse de 
la publicité des partis), cet article explore la thèse de la régionalisation dans le paysage politique 
ultérieur aux années 1990. Quoiqu'il y ait un vaste consensus chez les analystes selon lequel le 
système des partis canadiens est hautement régionalisé, le présent article souligne des faits à 
l'inverse. Plutôt qu'une balkanisation de la politique partisane et électorale, nous observons une 
re-nationalisation de la politique des partis canadiens. C'est surtout vrai des partis qui s'affrontent 
au Canada anglais. La régionalisation subsiste, cependant, dans la province de Québec. Non 
seulement le Bloc Québécois y représente-t-il en soi une force régionale, mais la présence de ce 
parti influence les stratégies des autres partis qui y sont présents. La résultante de cette 
dynamique compétitive différente au Québec, c'est que nous sommes en présence de deux 
systèmes de partis distincts: un système régional de parti au Québec et un système national de 
parti ailleurs au Canada. 
Mots-clés: partis politiques; nationalisation des partis, régionalisation, système de partis 
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Introduction 
 
For decades scholars of political parties have 
concerned themselves with the 
nationalization of parties, electorates, and 
party systems (Caramani, 2004; Chhibber 
and Kollman, 2004; Claggett et al. 1984; 
Cox, 1997; Jones and Mainwaring, 2003; 
Kasuya and Moenius, 2007; Kwato, 1987; 
Schattschneider, 1960). Nationalization can 
be broadly defined as the process whereby 
the behaviour of parties and voters becomes 
more geographically uniform and consistent 
over time. Caramani (2004:1) describes 
nationalization as a phenomenon where 
“peripheral and regional specificities 
disappear, and sectional cleavages 
progressively transform into nationwide 
functional alignments”.  
In the Canadian literature, the focus 
of scholars has not been on nationalization 
but instead emphasis has been given to 
regionalization (Blake, 1972; Blake, 1985; 
Cairns, 1968; Carty et al., 2000; Cross, 
2002; Schwartz, 1974; Young and Archer, 
2002). As former Prime Minister William 
Lyon Mackenzie King once remarked, “if 
some countries have too much history, we 
have too much geography.” In contrast to 
nationalization, regionalization refers to 
party and voter behaviour that lacks 
nationwide uniformity and varies, often 
considerably, from one region or province to 
another. 
In Canada, regionalization has 
manifested itself through the rise of 
regionalist political parties that compete in a 
single province or region and through parties 
that compete nationwide but have clearly 
defined regional or provincial bases of 
electoral support. Much of this is a result of 
the dealignment of federal and provincial 
party systems and the breakdown of 
traditionally organizationally integrated 
political parties that has occurred in recent 
decades. While federal and provincial party 
systems were once congruent, recent 
decades have witnessed widespread 
divergence. In particular, organizationally 
truncated parties that operate only at a single 
level have become increasingly common. At 
the provincial level, this includes parties 
such as the Wildrose in Alberta, the 
Saskatchewan Party, and the Parti 
Quebecois.  
While a focus on regionalism has 
been a staple in Canadian political science, 
the topic gained renewed attention in the 
1990s from scholars of political parties. Two 
inherently regional parties emerged with 
great electoral success during the 1993 
federal election: one that competed only in 
French Canada (Bloc Quebecois), and 
another that competed only in English 
Canada (Reform).
2
 What's more, these new 
parties helped shape a unique pattern of 
party competition that clearly defined the 
1993 and 1997 federal elections and 
separated these elections from all those 
elections that had come before.
3
 Ultimately, 
these new parties and the new patterns of 
competition that they created have given rise 
to what can be termed the regionalization 
thesis. This argument, most prominently put 
                                                          
2
 While the Reform party saw its debut in the 1988 
election, and elected its first MP in a 1989 by-
election, it was not until the 1993 that the party had 
its breakthrough. 
3
 Federal parties have often been accused of resting 
on the organizations built by the provincial wings of 
the party (Stewart and Carty, 2006: 101). Doing so 
allows federal parties to have organizations in all of 
the provinces and thus be more competitive 
statewide. While federal parties may have been able 
to rest on provincial machines to achieve 
nationalization in the past, the new federal parties of 
the 1990s had no such provincial counterparts to rely 
on. The Reform party, for example, competed only at 
the federal level and did not have provincial branches 
of the party to rely on for support across the country. 
It is worth noting that nationalization may therefore 
be related to party integration. That is, party system 
congruence and integrated federal-provincial party 
organizations may facilitate nationalization at the 
federal level. 
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forth by Carty, Cross, and Young (2000), 
suggests that national parties and national 
elections are no longer present in Canada. 
The result, the authors suggest, is a set of 
regionally distinctive party systems where 
elections are fought and lost based on local 
issues in different regions across the 
country. As Carty et al. (2000:34) explain: 
Throughout the third party system, 
Canadians had participated in a 
genuinely national system…The 
1993 political explosion tore up this 
pattern and left the country 
balkanized, with a set of regionally 
distinctive party systems. Canadians 
no longer faced a common set of 
electoral forces or political options. 
Instead, each region spurred its own 
distinctive party system... 
Nor were Carty, Cross, and Young alone in 
their assertions. A similar argument was 
made by Bickerton, Gagnon, and Smith 
(1999: 194) in their book Ties that Bind. 
Writing about the electoral landslide that 
occurred in 1993, they argue that: 
These shifts have increased the 
balkanization of the Canadian 
electorate and party system. The 
divisions between parties and voters 
have been magnified and multiplied; 
regional bases of party support and 
activity are more sharply delineated; 
and the pattern of voter loyalties and 
preferences is more spatially 
differentiated. 
There is, however, a great deal of debate 
about the nature and characteristics of the 
party system. According to Lapp 
(2002:633), the regionalization thesis 
presented by Carty, Cross, and Young is an 
“impressive opening volley in what 
promises to be a long and lively debate over 
the nature and the role of parties in the 
Canadian political process.” Others, 
however, have been more critical. Clarkson 
(2001: 15), for example, has argued that the 
regionalization thesis is greatly exaggerated: 
“there is much less evidence of change than 
[Carty, Cross, and Young] maintain – 
whether this be a change in the party system, 
change in the nature of the parties 
themselves, or change in the manner in 
which they wage their campaigns.” 
This paper adds to the debate by 
examining the five federal elections that 
have occurred since the 1990s.  In doing so, 
this paper makes two primary contributions. 
First, it applies widely established measures 
of party/party system nationalization to the 
Canadian case in order to assess the degree 
of regionalization that remains. While 
considerable attention has been devoted to 
the 1993 and 1997 elections (Carty et al., 
2000; Clarke and Kornberg, 1996; Erickson, 
1995; Nevitte et al., 2000; Patten, 2007), 
relatively little work has been done in the 
elections that followed the turbulence of the 
1990s. Given recent developments, there are 
a variety of reasons to expect that the 
Canadian party system, and the individual 
parties that make up that system, have re-
nationalized. In particular, the merger of the 
Canadian Alliance and the Progressive 
Conservatives, the introduction of campaign 
finance reform that incentivises nationwide 
competition,
4
 and the resurgence of support 
                                                          
4
 2004 party financing legislation required a party to 
either win 5 per cent of the vote in all of the 
constituencies in which it had candidates or 2 per 
cent of the vote nationally to be eligible for funding. 
This provided parties with an incentive to compete 
nationwide, as it would be easier to achieve the 2 per 
cent threshold. The Green Party, for example, 
competed in every Canadian riding in 2004 under the 
new financing rules compared to less than 40 per cent 
in the previous election. The financing legislation 
therefore had a nationalizing impact on the party 
system. As the direct per vote subsidy is being phased 
out, the implications for nationalization are uncertain. 
It is unclear, for example, whether smaller parties 
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for Canada's brokerage parties all suggest 
that a re-examination of the regionalization 
thesis is in order. 
The second contribution concerns the 
way we measure nationalization/ 
regionalization. Current indicators tend to 
focus on the voter side of the equation and 
do not adequately account for party strategy. 
A party may very well appear national in 
support (receiving a similar share of the vote 
in all provinces) while simultaneously 
behaving in a regional manner. A measure 
of nationalization is needed that has the 
ability to capture cross-provincial 
differences in party behaviour. In this sense, 
we need to 'bring parties back in' and study 
not only electoral results but also party 
inputs. To address this limitation, the paper 
examines the messages that the parties are 
transmitting. If a political party is 
nationalized, it is expected that this will be 
reflected in their campaign advertising and 
techniques. In the Canadian case, for 
example, this would mean that the same 
messages should be transmitted in English 
and French. Regardless of vote share or 
electoral success, a party cannot be 
considered to be truly national if it wages 
dramatically different campaigns in the 
various regions of the country. 
Using three widely established 
indicators (party coverage, uniformity of 
support, and patterns of electoral 
competition), and one new measure 
(analysis of party advertisements), this paper 
explores the regionalization thesis in the 
post 1990s political landscape. What we are 
witnessing is not a balkanization of 
Canadian electoral and party politics but 
rather a re-nationalization of Canadian party 
politics. The evidence provided in this paper 
demonstrates that Canadian parties, and the 
party system as a whole, are more 
nationalized than previously thought. This is 
                                                                                       
will continue to compete nationally without the 
monetary incentive.  
especially true for those parties that compete 
in English Canada. Where regionalization 
does still exist is in the province of Quebec. 
Although the Bloc suffered a significant 
electoral setback in the 2011 federal 
election, the party represents a strong 
regionalizing force in the Canadian party 
system nonetheless. What’s more, the 
party’s very presence in Quebec alters the 
strategies of the other parties that compete in 
Quebec. The Bloc does so by forcing the 
Liberals, Conservatives, and to a lesser 
extent the New Democrats, to engage in 
regional politics by targeting Quebecers 
explicitly, therefore abandoning their 
national messages when competing in the 
province of Quebec.  Despite the continued 
influence and impact of the Bloc, the 
analysis of Canadian parties provided here 
demonstrates more nationalization than the 
literature suggests.   
 
Party Coverage 
 
The first measures of nationalization 
focused on competition indices (Caramani, 
2004; Bochsler, 2010). As Schattschneider 
(1960), Urwin (1982), and Caramani (2004) 
each note, the most basic measure of 
nationalization is the degree of statewide 
party competition. Parties and party systems 
are to be considered national if parties 
compete throughout the country rather than 
focusing on certain constituencies or 
regional strongholds. Cornford (1970) 
operationalized nationalization by 
measuring the number of “safe seats”. That 
is, the number of constituencies where a 
party faced little or no opposition.  In a 
similar fashion, others have counted the 
number of uncontested seats in their study 
of party competition.  
Caramani (2004) has refined these 
competition measures, creating a territorial 
coverage index. This measure calculates the 
number of ridings in which a party has a 
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candidate as a percentage of the total 
number of constituencies. Parties that field 
candidates in all or most constituencies and 
therefore compete nationwide are 
considered to be national while those parties 
that compete in a single province or have 
considerable gaps in their coverage are 
considered regional. While the territorial 
coverage index is not the most robust 
measure in the study, it does provide a 
useful starting point for our analysis of 
individual parties and the party system as a 
whole. Before examining electoral support, 
campaign techniques, or broad patterns of 
competition, we first need to understand 
where the parties are competing and where 
they are absent. Using Caramani's territorial 
coverage index, Table 1 includes individual 
party coverage scores and the average total 
coverage for each election. 
 
Table 1: Party Coverage by Party (2000-2011)  
Party 2000 2004 2006 2008 2011 
Liberal 100% 100% 100% 99.7% 100% 
Conservative  - 100% 100% 99.7% 99.7% 
New Democrat 99.3% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Bloc Quebecois 24.9% 24.3%* 24.3% 24.3% 24.3% 
Canadian Alliance 99.7% - - - 99.7 % 
Progressive Conservative 99% - - - 99 % 
Election Average 84.6% 81% 81% 81% 81% 
Election Average (Without Bloc) 99.5% 100% 100% 99.8% 99.8% 
*The reason for the decline in coverage from 24.9 per cent to 24.3 per cent is due to the increase of seats in the House 
of Commons from 301 in 2000 to 308 in 2004. These seven new seats were used to adjust the House in terms of 
population redistribution. The new seats were divided as follows: Ontario (3), Alberta (2), and British Columbia (2). 
 
As Table 1 makes clear, Canada's major 
political parties cover a tremendous proportion 
of the constituencies nationwide. With only 
few exceptions, the Liberals, New Democrats, 
and Conservatives compete in, or cover, 
nearly 100 per cent of Canada’s political 
territory in each federal election. In fact, the 
commitment to nationwide party competition 
is so strong that the Progressive Conservatives 
rejected the notion that they should field joint 
candidates with the Reform Party, despite the 
fact that vote splitting on the right was leading 
to significant Liberal gains. In 1999 a majority 
of PC delegates endorsed the party's “301 
rule” prior to the 2000 election. This 
resolution, a commitment to run a candidate in 
each of the country's 301 electoral districts, 
prevented the party from having any 
meaningful electoral cooperation with the 
Reform or Canadian Alliance (Woolstencroft 
and Ellis, 2009: 80). Being perceived as a 
national party and having an electoral 
presence throughout the country was more 
important to the PCs than the immediate 
electoral gains that would have been won by 
ending the vote splitting that had plagued the 
parties on the right of the political spectrum. 
 Table 1 also demonstrates that the 
Reform Party's transformation into the 
Canadian Alliance had a positive impact on 
nationalization. As the party transformed 
itself, the primary focus of the party was no 
longer on the policy articulation of western 
interests but rather on vote maximization. 
Consequently, the party was forced to expand 
the area in which it competed.  In doing so, the 
party became much more national in scope. 
While the Reform Party covered 70 per cent of 
the ridings in the 1993 election and only a 
slightly higher percentage in 1997, it did not 
contest any seats outside of English Canada. 
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By the 2000 election, however, the Canadian 
Alliance was competing from coast to coast. 
That the Canadian Alliance competed in more 
than 99 per cent of the constituencies in the 
2000 election was a marked improvement 
from previous elections when the party had 
considerable gaps across the country. For 
example, competing in Quebec represented a 
symbolic and strategic effort on behalf of the 
party to move beyond its traditional western 
base in an attempt to be seen as a truly 
national political party as opposed to a 
regional vehicle for western policy 
articulation. When the Canadian Alliance 
merged with the Tories in 2003 this trend of 
nationwide competition continued. 
Overall, the Canadian party system has 
experienced a resurgence of national party 
coverage and competition in recent elections. 
This is in direct contrast to the 1993 and 1997 
elections which saw one major party only run 
candidates in English Canada and another only 
run candidates in French Canada. At the 
system level, the merger of the Canadian 
Alliance and Tories has replaced a party that 
covered 70 per cent of the country in 1993 for 
a party that has continuously covered over 99 
per cent of the constituencies in each of the 
elections that it has contested. In total, the 
major parties compete in more than 80 per 
cent of the country's 308 constituencies. 
What's more, when the Bloc is removed from 
analysis, this number increases to 99 per cent. 
In terms of electoral presence, it is clear that 
Canadian parties are national actors, 
competing from coast to coast. 
   
Uniformity of Support 
 
Although Canadian parties compete nationally 
it does not mean that their electoral support 
will be national as well. For example, a party 
may run candidates in every constituency and 
still have varying degrees of support 
throughout the different provincial units. 
While coverage is likely linked to support (a 
party cannot have uniform support if it does 
not compete nationally), it does not 
automatically follow that support will be 
nationalized simply because coverage is 
national. Likewise, parties may field 
candidates in all ridings but these candidates 
may be nothing more than names on paper. 
Coverage, therefore, does not provide 
sufficient grounds to make conclusions about 
the extent of nationalization. More than party 
coverage, nationalization also requires that 
parties receive homogeneous support across 
the country despite provincial borders. 
Homogeneity of support, as Claggett et al. 
explain, is when parties draw increasingly 
uniform or homogeneous levels of support 
across all of the geographic subunits of the 
electorate (1984:80). Nationalization thus 
involves the erasing or diminishing of 
provincial and regional patterns of electoral 
behaviour, replacing them with a more 
national or countrywide pattern of competition 
and results.  
A party's electoral support can be 
measured two ways, through either an 
examination of seats or votes. The literature, 
however, has frequently highlighted the 
tendency of the single member plurality 
(SMP) electoral system to distort electoral 
outcomes (see, for example, Russell, 2008). 
This distortion occurs because there is often a 
disconnect between the number of seats a 
party has captured and the percentage of the 
popular vote that the party has won. In 
particular, parties with regional bases of 
support are often rewarded far more 
generously than those that do not. Likewise, 
the SMP system tends to create false 
majorities by over-rewarding large parties. 
While seats are undoubtedly important, a 
simple example will illustrate the 
shortcomings of using seats over vote share in 
our analysis of party support. In the 1987 New 
Brunswick provincial election the Liberal 
Party received 60 per cent of the popular vote 
but won 100 per cent of the seats in the 
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legislature.
 5
 An examination of party support 
that focused on seats would therefore 
significantly overestimate the amount of 
support for the Liberal Party while 
simultaneously underestimating support for 
other parties, ignoring 40 per cent of the 
electorate. What's more, there have been a 
number of occasions (1957, 1962, and 1979) 
where a party with more votes has actually 
won fewer seats than its competitor (Courtney, 
2010: 131). This distortion necessitates that 
the vote share, and not the number of seats in 
the legislature, be examined to accurately 
study party support. 
Jones and Mainwaring (2003) offer an 
innovative way of measuring the uniformity of 
party support. Rather than using the traditional 
statistics that political scientists often use 
(standard deviation, variance, etc.) they 
suggest a measure that is associated with the 
field of economics.
6
 To measure the 
nationalization of political parties, they argue 
that the Gini
 
coefficient be subtracted from 1 
(Jones and Mainwaring, 2003:142). The Gini 
coefficient, a measure of statistical dispersion 
that is widely used to measure income 
inequality across geographical units, has been 
used in the field of economics for decades. 
This measure ranges from 0 in cases of perfect 
equality and 1 in cases of perfect inequality. 
Applying this measure to nationalization 
assesses the extent to which a party has won 
an equal share of the vote across all the 
geographical units.  By subtracting the Gini 
coefficient from 1, a high score indicates a 
high level of nationalization whereas a low 
score indicates a low level of nationalization.
7
 
Jones and Mainwaring term this the Party 
                                                          
5
 In a more recent case  (2008) the Conservative Party 
captured 93 per cent of the seats in Saskatchewan with 
only 54 per cent of the vote.  
6
 For a discussion of the shortcomings of these 
traditional methods see Caramani, 2004 or Bochsler, 
2010. 
7
 In accordance with Jones and Mainwaring (2003), the 
STATA command ‘ineqdec0’ was used to calculate the 
Gini coefficient.  
Nationalization Score (PNS). In addition to 
individual party scores, a system score can 
also be calculated. By multiplying the PNS for 
every party by its share of the popular vote 
and then summing across parties, we can 
create a system level score. Jones and 
Mainwaring term this the Party System 
Nationalization Score (PSNS).  
Table 2 contains the Party 
Nationalization Scores (PNS) for each party 
during the 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2011 
elections. Also included in Table 2 are the 
aggregated Party System Nationalization 
Scores (PSNS) for the same elections. Given 
the results, we can make a number of 
observations about individual parties and the 
party system as a whole.  
Perhaps the most interesting finding presented 
in Table 2 is that Canadian parties are 
considerably more national than they are 
typically depicted. Far from being 
“balkanized”, Canada’s major political parties 
routinely receive Party Nationalization Scores 
above 0.75. These scores reveal that the 
brokerage parties enjoy a considerable degree 
of uniform and consistent electoral support 
throughout the country. The Liberals, for 
instance, have an average PNS of 0.78, 
slightly higher than the New Democratic 
Party's 0.75. With the exception of the Bloc, 
all major parties scored 0.75 or higher in the 
post 2000 elections. More importantly, the 
scores of the Conservatives, Liberals, and 
New Democrats are once again consistent with 
the level of nationalization that they enjoyed 
prior to the regionalization of the 1993 
election. The New Democrats, for instance, 
received a PNS of 0.72 in 1980, however, this 
plummeted to 0.52 by 1993. The party's 
average PNS of 0.75 over the past five 
elections represents a considerable re-
nationalization of the party's electoral support.  
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Table 2: Party Nationalization Score and Party System Nationalization Score (2000-2011) 
Party 2000 2004 2006 2008 2011 Average 
Liberal 0.82 0.77 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.78 
Conservative - 0.87 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.84 
New Democrat 0.68 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.81 0.75 
Bloc Quebecois 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Progressive Conservative 0.63 - - - - - 
Canadian Alliance 0.57 - - - - - 
Party System  0.63 0.71 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.71 
Party System Without Bloc 0.70 0.80 0.81 0.79 0.81 0.78 
 
The Canadian Alliance's PNS 
illustrates that despite its efforts to compete 
nationwide in the 2000 election, the party 
received uneven support throughout the 
country. Ultimately, the party's lack of support 
east of Ontario resulted in a low PNS of 0.57. 
The 2000 election was the first time that the 
party had attempted to move beyond the west 
and despite its presence throughout the 
country (see Table 1), its image had yet to be 
solidified as a truly national party in the views 
of the electorate. Although the Canadian 
Alliance fared much better than the Bloc 
Quebecois (PNS of 0.08), the party still scored 
considerably lower than the traditional 
brokerage parties and its main competitor, the 
Liberal Party, which received a PNS of 0.82 in 
2000. Once the Tories and the Alliance 
merged, however, the newly formed 
Conservative Party consistently received a 
higher PNS than any of its rivals. The merger, 
which combined the Canadian Alliance’s 
strong western base with the central and 
eastern support for the Progressive 
Conservatives, resulted in the creation of 
Canada’s most nationalized party in terms of 
electoral support. 
 Figure 1 illustrates the sharp increase 
in nationalization between 2000 and 2004 for 
the Conservatives. The 2000 Conservative 
PNS represents the average of its two 
predecessors while the 2004 score represents 
the actual numbers from the party's first 
election. The Canadian Alliance and Tories 
had an average PNS of 0.60 in 2000, 
compared to the Conservative Party's 0.87 
PNS in 2004. This represents a considerable 
inter-election PNS change of 0.27. What's 
more, the Conservatives have been remarkably 
stable in their support since their first election 
in 2004, demonstrated by a mean inter-
election PNS change of only 0.02. Like the 
Liberals and New Democrats, this score is 
back to pre-1993 levels of nationalization. The 
Progressive Conservatives PNS of 0.84 in 
1984 is in line with the 0.84 PNS average of 
the new Conservative Party.  
In terms of electoral support, the Bloc 
remains the only regional party in the 
Canadian party system after the 2000 election. 
The Bloc's low PNS is not surprising, given 
that it only competes in the province of 
Quebec. In addition to receiving low Party 
Nationalization Scores, the Bloc further 
reduces the overall system score. As 
illustrated in Table 2, the low Bloc PNS has 
consistently lowered the system level PSNS. 
Overall, the presence of the Bloc has reduced 
the system level score by an average of 0.07 in 
each election. Despite the presence of the 
Bloc, the Canadian party system exhibits a 
moderately high degree of nationalization. The 
mean PSNS for the five elections is 0.71 and 
when the Bloc is excluded from the analysis, 
the average Canadian system level score 
increases to 0.78. It should be clear that even 
with the Bloc, the system cannot be 
considered balkanized in any meaningful way.  
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Patterns of Party Competition 
 
In addition to measuring coverage and 
support, students of political parties have often 
also examined broad patterns of electoral 
completion in order to study the 
regionalization of the party system. In the 
Canadian case, this means comparing patterns 
of competition across the various provinces. 
To the extent that there are only one or two 
distinct patterns of electoral competition, the 
party system can be considered nationalized. 
On the other hand, the party system is 
considered regionalized when there are a 
variety of different patterns of electoral 
competition across the country. 
In an attempt to demonstrate regionally 
fragmented party competition in Canada,  
 
 
Cross (2002:119-120) compared electoral 
results in 1988 to those of 1997 (Tables 3 and 
4). Those tables have been reproduced here 
and a third table for the 2011 election has been 
added.  In 1988, the Liberals and 
Conservatives were competitive across the 
country, with the New Democrats playing a 
significant role in Ontario and westward 
(Table 3). This resulted in two-party 
competition in Quebec and Atlantic Canada, 
and three-party competition in Ontario and 
Western Canada. Although the same pattern 
did not exist nationwide, there were only two 
unique patterns that existed across the country. 
Party competition during this time was, for the 
most part, nationalized as individual provinces 
did not have their own patterns but instead 
followed larger trends.  
 
Table 3: 1988 Federal Election Results 
Province Party winning most votes Parties winning at least half as many votes 
 
Newfoundland  Liberal Conservative 
Prince Edward Island  Liberal Conservative 
Nova Scotia  Liberal Conservative 
New Brunswick  Liberal Conservative 
Quebec  Conservative Liberal 
Ontario  Liberal Conservative, New Democratic 
Manitoba  Conservative Liberal, New Democratic 
Saskatchewan   New Democratic Conservative 
Alberta  Conservative  
British Columbia  New Democratic Conservative, Liberal 
Source: Cross 2002 
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Figure 1: Party Nationalization Score (2000-2011) 
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In 1997, by contrast, there was no clear pattern 
of nationwide party competition. Manitoba 
was the only province with four-party 
competition, Ontario was dominated by the 
Liberals, the traditional three parties (Liberals, 
Conservatives, and New Democrats) engaged 
in multi-party competition in Atlantic Canada, 
and Alberta was dominated by the Reform 
Party. As Cross writes, "There were, in fact, 
seven different models of party competition 
evident in the 1997 election, with every 
province outside of Atlantic Canada having a 
different constellation of competitive parties" 
(2002:19).  As Table 4 shows, regionally 
fragmented party competition was the defining 
feature of electoral and party politics during 
this period. 
 
Table 4: 1997 Federal Election Results 
Province Party winning most votes Parties winning at least half as many votes 
 
Newfoundland  Liberal Conservative, New Democratic 
Prince Edward Island  Liberal Conservative 
Nova Scotia  Conservative New Democratic, Liberal 
New Brunswick  Conservative Liberal, New Democratic 
Quebec  Bloc Quebecois Liberal, Conservative 
Ontario  Liberal   
Manitoba  Liberal Reform, New Democratic, Conservative 
Saskatchewan   Reform New Democratic, Liberal 
Alberta  Reform  
British Columbia  Reform Liberal 
Source: Cross 2002 
 
With the exception of the Bloc, Table 5 (2011 
election) shares a number of similarities to 
Table 3 (1988 election). In 2011, the 
Conservatives and New Democrats were 
competitive across the country, with the 
Liberals playing a significant role in Ontario 
and eastward. Not unlike 1988, two unique 
patterns of electoral competition can be found 
in the 2011 election. This includes three-party 
competition in Atlantic Canada, and two-party 
competition between the New Democrats and 
Conservatives in Ontario and westward. In the 
decade that followed the turbulence of the 
1990s, patterns of electoral competition have 
once again stabilized. The fragmentation that 
was evident during the 1997 election is all but 
gone in English Canada and the Bloc's second 
place finish in Quebec is all that remains of 
the regionalized and fragmented party 
competition that characterized the 1990s. In 
many respects, party competition in Canada 
has moved back to pre-1990 patterns: the 
Liberals, Conservatives, and New Democrats 
are the major players; fragmentation is 
minimal; and only two unique patterns of 
party competition can be identified. 
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Table 5: 2011 Federal Election Results 
Province Party winning most votes Parties winning at least half as many votes 
 
Newfoundland Liberal New Democratic, Conservative 
Prince Edward Island Conservative Liberal 
Nova Scotia Conservative New Democratic, Liberal 
New Brunswick Conservative New Democratic, Liberal 
Quebec New Democratic  Bloc 
Ontario Conservative New Democratic, Liberal 
Manitoba Conservative  
Saskatchewan  Conservative New Democratic 
Alberta Conservative  
British Columbia Conservative New Democratic 
 
Campaign Advertisements 
 
When considering the three established 
measures examined above, Canadian parties 
(with the exception of the Bloc) appear to be 
much more national than the literature 
suggests. There are, however, some limitations 
associated with these existing measures. In 
particular, party support and patterns of 
competition do not account for how parties 
achieve these ends. The existing measures 
largely ignore the possibility that parties are 
using regional tactics to achieve similar levels 
of support and success throughout the country. 
As Jones and Mainwaring note, their measure 
of party system nationalization (the PNS 
score) cannot capture this:  
A party might have pronounced 
cross-state differences in 
programmatic character and social 
base and yet win the same share of 
the vote in all of the states. On our 
measure, this party would be 
perfectly nationalized, 
notwithstanding the internal 
differences across states (Jones and 
Mainwaring, 2003: 142). 
In order to fill this gap we require a measure 
that can capture the cross-provincial 
differences in party behaviour and strategy. 
One way that parties can engage in 
differentiated cross-provincial behaviour is 
through the messages and issues that they 
emphasize during their campaigns. 
Traditionally, the established methodology for 
exploring issue emphasis has been analyzing 
party platforms. Budge and Farlie (1983), for 
example, engaged in a content analysis of 50 
years worth of party manifestos in Britain and 
the United States in a comprehensive 
examination of the ‘selectivity’ of issues.  In 
the case of nationalization, however, an 
examination of party platforms is insufficient. 
Party platforms are inherently national 
documents insomuch that they are available to 
everyone – the document is the same 
regardless of where you live. Despite the fact 
that platforms may include specific promises 
to particular provinces, they do not allow for 
inherently different messages to be sent to 
individual provinces or regions. Consequently, 
platforms cannot be used as a means of filling 
this gap.
8
 Given the inadequacy of examining 
platforms, this paper examines party 
                                                          
8
 Future research may consider party campaign 
literature more broadly. While election platforms are 
consistent from province to province, the pamphlets 
and other materials that parties distribute may vary 
considerably. Although this material may be difficult 
to acquire, it would serve as valuable method for 
examining cross-provincial party behaviour.  
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sponsored advertisements to develop a 
measure capable of capturing differences in 
party strategy. If parties are relying on 
regionally differentiated strategies for their 
support, we would expect to see this reflected 
in the messages that they are sending.  
The most direct and most effective 
way of communicating with voters is through 
the use of the television. It has been said that 
“modern election campaigns are media 
campaigns” (Blais et al., 2002: 35), with 
television representing the primary source of 
information for voters. As Cross (2002: 124) 
notes, more voters will watch a campaign 
advertisement on television than will talk to 
local party candidate or read party supported 
campaign literature. As such, the messages 
that parties send via campaign advertisements 
are a crucial part of party competition.  
Television initially had a nationalizing 
effect on Canadian party politics, encouraging 
and facilitating the “simultaneous delivery of 
the same partisan message to Canadians from 
coast to coast” (Carty et al., 2000: 200). It 
allowed for a level of consistency of party 
messages that political parties could not obtain 
with traditional print sources of media. More 
recently, however, students of party politics 
have questioned the nationalizing role of 
television in Canadian politics. While 
television easily allows the delivery of one 
message to the entire electorate, it can just as 
easily send different messages to different 
regions and provinces, targeting different 
groups within the electorate rather than the 
electorate as a whole. If the party system is 
nationalized, we expect to see this reflected in 
the messages that the parties are sending. In 
order to examine regionalism in cross-
provincial party strategies, party sponsored 
advertisements were coded based on the 
following three criteria:  
1. Does the advertisement specifically 
mention a region or province? 
2. Does a French language advertisement 
have an English counterpart? In other 
words, is there simultaneous delivery of 
the same message to both English and 
French Canada? 
3. Does the advertisement focus on 
sectional or national content? 
 
Subject to the availability of data, there 
are some limitations with the application of 
this approach.  First, we are unable to gather 
reliable data about the precise location where 
the advertisements were aired. Likewise, we 
are unable to determine how often each 
advertisement was aired. As a result, each 
advertisement is weighted the same in the 
analysis, despite the possibility that it was 
aired more or less than others. Despite these 
limitations, an analysis of advertisements will 
nonetheless provide valuable insight into party 
strategy and behaviour, especially as it relates 
to nationalization.  Overall, party 
advertisements are considered regional if they 
contain sectional content, single out particular 
provinces or regions, or if French 
advertisements do not have an English 
counterpart. Conversely, advertisements are 
considered national if they focus on national 
content, make no mention of individual 
provinces or regions, and deliver the same 
message in both French and English. 
In total, 76
 
advertisements that were 
produced for the 2008 Canadian federal 
election campaign were coded. Based on the 
available data this includes 37 Liberal, 27 
Conservative, and 12 New Democrat 
advertisements. Table 6 contains the results of 
the analysis for the 2008 election. The most 
important finding presented in Table 6 is the 
almost complete lack of regionalism found 
within the English language advertisements. 
None of the Conservative or New Democrat 
English language ads, for instance, singled out 
any province or region. Moreover, none of 
these ads focused on regionally specific 
content. For the Conservatives, the English 
language ads either focused on discrediting 
Liberal Leader Dion, or on issues that were 
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national in scope. These issues included 
foreign policy, childcare, immigration, Arctic 
sovereignty, and crime. As for the New 
Democrats, the message largely focused on 
leadership, contrasting Layton to Harper. 
Similar to the Conservatives and New 
Democrats, the Liberals only once appeared 
regional in their English language 
advertisements. In an advertisement titled 
'This is Harpernomics', the Liberal Party 
singled out Ontario and spoke about 
investment opportunities within the province. 
Otherwise, the English language ads were 
national in their message focusing on issues 
such as the economy, Stephen Harper’s 
leadership, and the Iraq war.
9
  
The French language advertisements, by 
contrast, tell a very different story. Nearly 100 
per cent of the regionalization found in party 
sponsored advertisements was targeted at 
Quebec. While 97 per cent of English 
language advertisements were national, a 
majority of advertisements in French (58%) 
were regional in tone and message. Not only 
did many of these advertisements mention 
Quebec specifically, but also they often 
focused on local issues that were uniquely 
important to Quebecers. The most prominent 
example of local content in the 2008 election 
campaign advertisements can be seen in the 
issue of proposed cuts to arts and culture 
                                                          
9
 Carty et al. (2000) and Cross (2002) have written 
about a different manifestation of regionalization in 
television advertising: micro targeting. Although 
issues such as the economy or leadership are not 
inherently regional, they may be more or less popular 
in certain provinces.  These authors contend that 
regional targeting allows parties to send seemingly 
national messages to provincial markets that are more 
receptive to the content. Ontario, for example, may 
get an ad about immigration while BC gets an ad 
about water supply. Both issues seem national but 
may have more traction and appeal in a certain 
province. Given that there is no reliable way to test 
this, our focus is on the content of the message and 
not necessarily on the delivery. The exception, of 
course, is in Quebec where the language of the ad 
makes it easy to identify the market.   
funding. This was particularly evident in the 
French advertisements by the Liberal and New 
Democratic parties. After announcing $45 
million of cuts to arts grants, the opposition 
parties took advantage of an opportunity to 
attack the governing Conservatives, claiming 
that the party was being openly hostile 
towards Quebec culture and identity. As 
Woolstencroft and Ellis (2009: 50) have 
noted, “the relatively minor issue had taken on 
singular importance in Quebec because of the 
close connection between culture and the 
province’s sense of identity.” The Liberal and 
New Democratic parties took advantage of 
this debate, creating numerous advertisements 
focusing on the importance of arts and culture 
funding and thus targeting and playing upon 
Quebec sympathies and fears about their own 
culture. These advertisements, of course, did 
not have an English language counterpart for 
viewing outside of Quebec.  
When the content of French language 
advertisements was more national in message, 
many of the French language advertisements 
did not have an English language counterpart. 
This included advertisements focusing on 
healthcare, prescription drugs, and abortion. 
While these issues are not inherently Quebec 
focused, they did not have English language 
counterparts that were aired in the rest of 
Canada.  It is also worth noting that the French 
language advertisements made by the 
Conservative Party ended with a different 
slogan than the English language 
advertisements. While the French ads 
produced for Quebec ended with the slogan 
“With the Conservatives Quebec Takes 
Force,” the English ads produced for the rest 
of the country ended with “Canada. We’re 
Better off With Harper.” The differentiated 
slogans represent yet another means of making 
direct appeals to the province. 
Table 6 highlights the findings of the 
analysis of party advertisements. In total, 37 
per cent of Liberal, 29 per cent of 
Conservative, and 17 per cent of New 
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Democrat advertisements can be considered 
regional. Overall, nearly one-in-three 
advertisements produced for the 2008 election 
campaign were regional in nature. The vast 
majority of this regionalization, however, was 
targeted at Quebec. Given that the 
Conservatives, Liberals, and New Democrats 
face a uniquely local opposition in Quebec, it 
is not surprising to find evidence of 
regionalism in French language election 
campaign advertising. As a result of the Bloc's 
ability to speak directly to Quebecers on the 
issues that they care about, the Liberals, 
Conservatives, and New Democrats are forced 
to adopt regional strategies in order to be 
competitive in the province. The Bloc, which 
is already a regionalizing force in itself 
(lowering party coverage and party system 
nationalization scores), further regionalizes 
the party system by forcing the national 
parties to appeal directly to Quebecers in a 
way that is fundamentally different from how 
the parties campaign in the rest of the country. 
When competing in Quebec, each of the major 
parties make targeted appeals and tailor their 
message directly for Quebecers, 
fundamentally changing how they contest 
election campaigns in the province.  
Table 6: Regionalism in Party Advertisements 
Party English 
Ads 
Regional 
English Ads 
French 
Ads 
Regional 
French Ads 
Total 
Ads 
Total Regional 
Ads 
Liberal 13 1 (7.7%) 24 13 (51%) 37 14 (38%) 
Conservative 18 0 (0%) 9 7 (78%) 27 7 (26%) 
NDP 7 0 (0%) 5 2 (40%) 12 2 (17%) 
Total 38 1 (3%) 38 22 (58%) 76 23 (30%) 
 
Conclusions 
 
The evidence presented in this paper is 
somewhat mixed. In English Canada, the 
major parties compete in all constituencies, 
receive relatively uniform levels of support, 
and focus on national issues with their 
advertising and message. Due in large part to 
the merger on the right, Canada's major parties 
have returned to pre 1993 levels of 
nationalization. In Quebec, by contrast, the 
dynamics of party strategy and electoral 
competition are very different. The presence 
and continued strength of the Bloc has altered 
the strategies of Canada's national parties. As 
the analysis of 2008 election advertising has 
demonstrated, the Liberals, Conservatives, and 
New Democrats each use party sponsored 
advertising to speak directly to Quebecers, 
sending the province targeted advertisements 
not shown in the rest of the country. While 
their English advertising is national in scope, 
their French advertising is distinctly regional. 
When competing in Quebec, these parties 
abandon their 'national' characteristics and 
engage with the Bloc in regional politics. As a 
result, Quebec becomes its own party system; 
there is a different constellation of parties 
competing, different issues being debated, and 
different strategies being utilized. The 
situation in Quebec is therefore in sharp 
contrast to the re-nationalization of parties and 
party competition that we are witnessing in the 
rest of the country. As Carty and Young write, 
it is "a misnomer to talk about 'the' national 
campaign in the Canadian context. In reality, 
each Canadian general election encompasses 
two national elections: one in its English, the 
other in its French-speaking areas" 
(2012:227). The evidence provided in this 
paper supports this claim, demonstrating two 
very different party systems and campaigns.  
Overall, the current party system 
should not be characterized as being highly 
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regionalized. Instead, it should be viewed as a 
nationalized system in English Canada and a 
regionalized system in Quebec. While Carty, 
Cross, and Young (2000) were correct to 
describe the 1993 and 1997 elections as being 
highly regionalized, this paper demonstrates 
that their predictions of balkanization did not 
hold true for the five elections that followed. 
More than a party system in its own right, we 
should think of the two elections of the 1990s 
as a period of transition. Due to the 
unprecedented magnitude of the electoral 
earthquake that shook the Canadian political 
landscape in 1993, the party system 
completely collapsed. After a period of 
rebuilding in the 1990s, Canadian party 
politics appears to have stabilized over the 
past decade. What we are left with is two 
distinct party systems: a regional party system 
in Quebec and a national party system in the 
rest of Canada.  
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